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Background: In 2009, health-care reform was launched to achieve universal health coverage in China. A good
understanding of how China’s health reforms are influencing village doctors’ income structure will assist authorities
to adjust related polices and ensure that village doctors employment conditions enable them to remain motivated
and productive. This study aimed to investigate the village doctors’ income structure and analyse how these health
policies influenced it.
Methods: Based on a review of the previous literature and qualitative study, village doctors’ income structure was
depicted and analysed. A qualitative study was conducted in six counties of six provinces in China from August 2013 to
January 2014. Forty-nine village doctors participated in in-depth interviews designed to document their income structure
and its influencing factors. The themes and subthemes of key factors influencing village doctors’ income structure were
analysed and determined by a thematic analysis approach and group discussion.
Results: Several policies launched during China’s 2009 health-care reform had major impact on village doctors. The
National Essential Medicines System cancelled drug mark-ups, removing their primary source of income. The government
implemented a series of measures to compensate, including paying them to implement public health activities and
provide services covered by social health insurance, but these have also changed the village doctors’ role. Moreover,
integrated management of village doctors’ activities by township-level staff has reduced their independence, and
different counties’ economic status and health reform processes have also led to inconsistencies in village doctors’
payment. These changes have dramatically reduced village doctors’ income and employment satisfaction.
Conclusions: The health-care reform policies have had lasting impacts on village doctors’ income structure since the
policies’ implementation in 2009. The village doctors have to rely on the salaries and subsidies from the government
after the drug mark-up was cancelled. China’s national health reforms are attempting to draw village doctors into the
national health workforce, but the policies have impacted their income and independence. Further research into these
concerns and monitoring of measures to adequately compensate village doctors should be undertaken. Reasonable
compensation strategies should be established, and sufficient subsidies should be allocated in a timely manner.Background
Human health resources are crucial to building sustain-
able health systems worldwide [1]. The ability of a coun-
try to achieve universal health coverage depends largely
on the motivation and deployment of health workers
who are responsible for delivering health services [2].* Correspondence: tian65216@hotmail.com
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unless otherwise stated.Studies on the severe shortage and maldistribution of
health workers have been conducted in recent years, es-
pecially in rural and remote areas [3,4], and the severe
shortage of health workers is a critical issue that must be
addressed through policy, planning and implementation
of innovative strategies, especially in Pacific and Asian
countries [5]. How to attract, retain and motivate health
workers in rural areas is a great challenge in the world,
especially in low- and middle-income countries, and the
underlying reasons for the shortage of health workersThis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
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payment systems influence the motivation and retention
of the primary care providers [5-7]. In rural China, village
doctors act as the backbone of the medical system, per-
forming basic medical care and public health services
[8-11]. A good understanding of village doctors’ income
is essential for the government to develop appropriate
strategies to provide strong incentives to improve
health workers’ productivity and retain staff in rural
areas and form the basis for performance assessment
and performance-based financing of village doctors’
work [12,13].
In China, the barefoot doctor system was introduced
in the mid-1960s, whereby health workers were recruited
from among the farmers, given limited training and sup-
ported through the Cooperative Medical Scheme (CMS)
to provide preventive and basic health services and referral
to higher level units, often while still engaged in farming
work [14]. Prior to implementation of this policy, in 1955,
CMS was established to underwrite the cost of health care
for the rural population through the communes [14]. By
the end of the 1960s, a three-tiered system of health pro-
viders in rural areas has been successfully established [15].
These public health achievements made China an inter-
national model for primary health care for the World
Health Organization’s Declaration of Alma-Ata [16]. At
that time, services in rural area were basic, but population
coverage for health services was high, and services were
generally accessible. Barefoot doctors were selected and
supported by their villages, and they were accountable to
the village committee [17]. They earned their income by
generating “work points (gongfen in Chinese)” with medical
services, similar to farmers doing agricultural work, and
their income was counted by converting time for medical
service to similar time for agricultural work [8,15,18]. There
were no incentives for individual innovation or for
profiteering.
The economic reforms of the 1980s signalled a transi-
tion from the planned economy towards the Socialist-
Market Economy, and in the rural areas, there was a
major shift in decision making and financial responsibil-
ity for farming from the village (or commune) to the
family [9,14]. With this shift, the financial base for the
CMS disappeared. The original barefoot doctor system,
called village doctors after 1985, collapsed in 1981 be-
cause they lost their political and financial support [19].
From that time on, village doctors started charging
patients for their services [20]. Because of the new
economic incentives, they began to shift their focus to
treatment rather than preventative care [7]. Although
village doctors could obtain subsidies for their work on
preventive health, anti-epidemic work, maternal and
child health and other administrative affairs, it was
only a small part of their income, averaging 5% to 10%[21-23]. Health workers were forced to seek alternative
sources of income for their survival, and a fee-for-
service system became the dominant way to pay village
doctors [17].
With the changes in epidemiological patterns, the gov-
ernment realized the importance of strengthening rural
health systems and developing community-based primary
care in China [24-28]. To improve the overall function of
the rural health service network, the Minister of Health
proposed the Integrated Management of Township Health
Centers (THCs) and village clinics in 2002. Integrated
Management was further developed in 2009, and THCs
are in charge of the management of village clinics, includ-
ing medicine, personnel, finance, facilities, routine work,
etc. In the meantime, the New Rural Cooperative Medical
Scheme (NRCMS) was developed and became widespread
after 2003 [15,29]. Since then, the level of medical insur-
ance for rural residents has continued to increase, and
therefore, rural residents have become more likely to visit
a doctor.
In 2009, the Chinese Central Government proposed the
establishment of the National Essential Medicines System
(NEMS) [29,30], which covers drug production, pricing,
distribution, procurement, prescribing and payment and
instigated a “zero-mark-up” policy for medicines on the
new National Essential Drugs List when they were pre-
scribed at the grassroots level [31]. Concurrently, the
National Basic Public Health programme was launched
for all residents, and the THCs and village clinics had to
provide time-consuming basic public health services to
rural residents. Health policy emphasized the shift in tasks
from treatment to public health services to strengthen the
rural health system and fight chronic disease. Over 5 years,
changes had been made to village doctors’ work roles and
their income structure, but these changes had not been
clearly clarified and studied.
Health policies continue to impact village doctors’ in-
come structure. A good understanding of how China’s
health reforms since 2009 are influencing village doctors’
income structure is very important. It will assist author-
ities to adjust related polices and ensure that village doc-
tors’ employment conditions enable them to remain
motivated and productive. This study examines key
policy-related influences on village doctors’ incomes,
functions and satisfaction by focusing on the sources
and changes in their income since these health reforms
were introduced.Methods
Qualitative study
This qualitative study was based on in-depth interviews
with village doctors between August 2013 and January
2014. Interviews were conducted in Chinese by a team
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view process.
Sampling
A stratified multi-stage cluster sampling method was used
to select the sample [32]. During the first stage, Jiangsu
Province (southeast), Henan Province (middle), Jiangxi
Province (middle), Heilongjiang Province (northeast),
Sichuan Province (southwest) and Gansu Province
(northwest) were selected from the 34 provinces or mu-
nicipalities of China. Second, one county or district was
chosen from each province or municipality as follows:
Changshu county from Jiangsu, Xichuan county from
Henan, Xinjian county from Jiangxi, Acheng district
from Heilongjiang, Pingchang county from Sichuan and
Maiji district from Gansu. Third, three towns were se-
lected from each county, taking into account heterogen-
eity in economic development. Fourth, three village
clinics were selected from each town, and only the village
clinic directors were interviewed. Although the geographic
distribution and socioeconomic status were taken into ac-
count in the sampling process, the sampling steps were
not random in this study. More detailed information about
the sampling locations is shown in Table 1. Overall, 49 of
54 village doctors (village clinic directors) from 6 counties
of 6 provinces participated in the survey, and the response
rate was 90.7%. The demographic characteristics of the
participants are shown in Table 2. All participants were
provided with an information leaflet and consented to
be interviewed. The study protocol was approved by the
Ethical Review Board of School of Social Development












































Source: aData from the Statistical Communique of sampling counties on the 2012 N
bOnline data (in 2012) published by the health bureaus of sampling counties.
cData (in 2012) provided by the health bureaus of sampling counties.Data collection
All the interviews were conducted in village clinics using
a pre-prepared, open-ended interview schedule. The
interview schedule (showed in Additional file 1) was di-
vided into the following two parts: basic information
(age, gender, education, the qualification for medical
practice, year started working as a village doctor, the
manner of obtaining their highest degree of certification
and the way village doctor practises medicine) and the
open-ended questions (including administration and
management, roles and workload, income and income
structure, changes of income structure, policy factors in-
fluencing income structure and perspectives on the
health-care policies). Six interviewers conducted the in-
terviews, which took 30–60 min per village doctor. All
the interviewers were trained for 36 h by the leader of
the research group, and an instruction and coding man-
ual was provided to each interviewer who took part in
this study. All the interviews were audio recorded, and
all the detailed information of the interviews was catego-
rized by research assistants. After the interviews, the
audio data were transcribed verbatim and filed by re-
searchers and research assistants.
Data analysis
Thematic analysis was used to analyse the qualitative data
between April 2014 and May 2014. All team members
read the materials thoroughly several times to obtain a
sense of the whole. Afterwards, key words and themes
were identified and coded. The coding differences were re-
solved through thorough discussion to ensure that all per-










19,467a 4.55b 2.99b 1.16b
13,487b 1.09b 1.60b 1.21c
9,018a 2.27a 1.29b 1.53b
9,817a 2.51b 1.23b 1.37c
6,115a 1.60a 1.60a 1.94b
3,825a 2.97b 1.35c 1.60c
ational Economic and Social Development.
Table 2 Demographic characteristics of village doctors







41 ~ 50 15 (30.6)
51 ~ 60 16 (32.7)
>60 10 (20.4)
Years of working as a village doctor (year)
≤20 10 (20.4)
21 ~ 40 29 (59.2)
>40 10 (20.4)
Education
Junior college or above 6 (12.2)
Secondary school or below 43 (87.8)
The manner of obtaining the highest degree of certification
Prior to employment 15 (30.6)
On-the-job training 34 (69.4)
The way of practising medicine
Western medicine 27 (55.1)
The traditional Chinese medicine 4 (8.2)
Combined therapy of Chinese and western medicine 18 (36.7)
Total 49 (100)
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themes and subthemes of key policy factors influencing
village doctors’ income.Results
Village doctors’ income components
Previous studies showed that village doctors’ income
structure varied in the different geographic locations
[33,34]. In this study, village doctors’ incomes were di-
vided into the following six components (Table 3):Table 3 Village doctor’s income structure among different coun





ChangShu Y Y N Y
XiChuan N Y Y Y
XinJian N Y Y Y
Acheng N Y Y Y
PingChang N Y Y Y
MaiJi N Y N N1) Salary: Money that employees receive for doing
their job, especially professional employees working
in an office, usually paid every month, not including
benefits, bonuses or any other potential
compensation;
2) Allowance for basic public health services: To provide
each rural resident with free National Basic Public
Health Services (NBPHS), central and local
governments have subsidized public health
programmes since 2009, and the level of funding
has risen year by year, from 15 RMB (US$ 2.4) in
2009–2010 to 25 RMB (US$ 4.0) in 2011–2012,
to 30 RMB (US$ 4.8) in 2013, and to 35 RMB
(US$ 5.6) per capita in 2014 [35], and village
doctors can obtain approximately 40% of the
funds for NBPHS, which means 6–14 RMB per
capita in the corresponding year would be
allocated to village doctors according to the
current policy [35,36];
3) Remuneration for drug sales: According to NEMS,
government-owned primary health-care providers
must sell essential medicines with zero-mark-up [31],
which means they are not allowed to charge the
patients a mark-up, but village doctors are entitled to
a government payment of about 15% of total drug
sales to compensate for the loss of the drug mark-ups
[36]. While remuneration for drug sales is
generally calculated on the basis of total drug
sales, there is always a ceiling on the total
government payment;
4) General fee for medical service: In the village clinics
that had implemented NEMS, registration fee,
checkup fee, injection fee (including intravenous
infusion fees, excluding drug costs) and dispensing
fee were merged into the general medical fee for
medical service. Commonly, the fee for medical
services and prescriptions is about 5–10 RMB of
which the patient pays 20%, and the rest is paid
through the NRCMS. [35-37]. The patients should
pay up the one fifth general fee for medical services
in most areas and seek reimbursement for drugs.
Also, there is always a ceiling in total from theties







Zhang et al. Human Resources for Health  (2015) 13:26 Page 5 of 11government. If remuneration for drug sales exceeds
the ceiling, there will be no further payment from
the government;
5) Profits from drug sales: Quite a few village doctors
still sell drugs with a mark-up secretly because of in-
sufficient financial resources of the local
government;
6) Other income: Allowance from local governments or
collectives and non-medical income, such as money
from farming and other jobs.
It is important to note that the implementation of the
national policy in different sampling locations has not
been simultaneous. Therefore, the practical situation dif-
fers significantly from county to county in China, and vil-
lage doctors’ income structure also varied with sampling
location in this study (Table 3). Furthermore, differences
in income structure also occurred in the same place as a
result of lax supervision of the local government.
Factors that influence village doctors’ income structure
From in-depth interviews, the following four main factors
influencing village doctors’ income structure were found:
the integrated management of rural health organizations
including THCs and village clinics, the NEMS, NBPHS
and NRCMS. As a result of the comprehensive effects of
these four policies, drug mark-up was cancelled gradually,
and village doctors had to rely on salaries, remuneration
for selling essential medicines, the allowance from the
NBPHS and the general fee for medical service from the
government.
Integrated management
The integrated management of rural health organizations
was an essential factor determining village doctors’ income
structure in China. In 2009, integrated management was
restored, that is, THCs began to be responsible for the
management of the village clinics again, including medi-
cine, personnel, finance, facilities, routine work, etc. Spe-
cifically, all work related to the medical services of village
doctors was under the supervision and management of
THCs. In reality, the organization and implementation of
integrated management had a decisive effect on village
doctors’ income structure. However, the process of imple-
mentation of integrated management varies in different
sampling counties.
As we found in Changshu county, which is the third of
China’s 100 wealthiest counties in 2014 [38], with a GDP
per capita of 123,882 RMB (US$ 19,953.6) in 2012, inte-
grated management has been rigorously implemented.
Village clinics, which are owned by the village collective,
are regarded as the affiliated agencies of THCs, and the
village doctors are strictly managed by THCs in many
aspects, such as facilities, routine work, medicine andfinance. Village doctors received a salary, an allowance
for NBPHS, remuneration for selling essential medicines
and a general fee for their medical service from NRCMS
according to the payment systems of the THCs. In
addition, village doctors’ working hours were regulated,
and they were not allowed to perform agricultural or
other side activities for other income. It is important to
note that there was a fairly good collective economic
foundation in Changshu county; the village clinics have
never been completely free from the collective owner-
ship of the village and have been under the supervision
of their village committee. Understandably, the imple-
mentation of the integrated management of rural health
organizations policy in 2009 was relatively easy and bet-
ter compared with other counties in this study.
In contrast, in Maiji district, which is a state poverty
county with per capita GDP of 19,586 RMB (US$ 3,154.7)
in 2012, village doctors still functioned as self-employed
workers. Only those who were selected as public health
workers to perform public health services could obtain an
allowance from the NBPHS and general fee for medical
service from the government. There was minimal supervi-
sion of village doctors’ routine work, drugs and finance
from THCs, and they did not receive a salary. Although
the policy on NEMS was also implemented in Maiji dis-
trict, there was no strict supervision. Village doctors could
still make a profit (mark-up of 15%) from selling essential
drugs on the National Essential Medicine List because the
remuneration for selling essential medicines was not given
to the village doctors in a timely manner. Occasionally,
some village doctors received a small remuneration. As a
village doctor said, “NEMS exists in name only here”.
In some counties, a performance appraisal was used to
monitor and manage village doctors’ routine work. Spec-
ifications for NEMS and NBPHS were regarded as the
basis for the payment of subsidies. If the village doctors
could not meet the quality requirement, they would lose
part of their subsidies. The performance appraisal was
mainly conducted by THCs; in other words, THCs act as
both the player and the referee during the process of
performance appraisal. Thus, the assessment was often
unfair because of the conflicts between village doctors
and THCs.
It is difficult to achieve these goals (set by superiors),
so we can get only a part of the allowance. (in Xinjian
county)They are both the referee and players, how can we win
then (to get full allowance fairly from township health
workers). (in Acheng district)
In the past, village doctors were practising personally.
In integrated management, THCs are in charge of the
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personnel, finance, facilities and routine work. Village doc-
tors act more similar to workers in THCs, which means
they should comply with the provisions of village clinics
and THCs. They could not leave their post in village clinics
without permission for other activities as before, and their
absenteeism would be trigger a warning or penalty. In some
areas, village doctors needed to work full-time and were on
duty in village clinics, so some revenue-generating activi-
ties,such as farming, were limited.
We must be on duty, or we will be fined. (in Changshu
county)In the past, during busy farming seasons, I was always
going to do farm work for my family, but now, I can’t.
(in Xinjian county)
National Essential Medicines System
The main purpose of the NEMS was to improve popula-
tion access to essential medicines, reduce medical costs
and guide doctors to use medicines safely, especially in
primary rural medical institutions [31,39]. The NEMS
oversees drug production, pricing, distribution, procure-
ment, prescribing and payment [39]. According to NEMS,
only drugs in the National Essential Medicine List (NEML)
were permitted in THCs and accessible to village doctors
and must to be sold with zero-mark-up, but doctors
could obtain remuneration for drug sales (at approximately
a 15% mark-up) for drug sales from the government
[30,36,40]. However, the actual implementation is quite
different among the six counties in this study. For example,
we found that no non-essential drugs were used in the vil-
lage clinics in Changshu county, while non-essential drugs
were still used in many village clinics and sold with mark-
up in village clinics in Maiji district and Acheng district.
Funds for remuneration for NEMS come from govern-
ments at all levels but were assigned at the county level
in accordance with the regulations established by each
county government. The amount of funds and allocation
strategies differed largely among different counties due
to the different economic situations and administration
consciousness of the local government, especially that
of the top leadership. For example, village doctors could
obtain 3,000 RMB per month in Changshu county on
average, while only a few hundred Yuan were allocated
to village doctors in Maiji district. Compared with the
past, when a village doctor could receive much more
than the 15% drug mark-up, their medical income fell
dramatically in most areas.
Before, drug profits could be 30,000-40,000 RMB a
year, but now there is less than 10,000 RMB from drug
profits instead (in Xinjian county)In the past, drug profits were our major revenue,
about half of our income. Now, we can only get a
limited amount of drug subsidies from the government.
It is even not enough for us to make a living.
(in Xinjian county)
In the village clinics that had implemented NEMS, vil-
lage doctors could get remuneration for drug sales.
Moreover, the allocation of the remuneration differed
greatly in different areas, due to varied historical, social
and economic conditions. In some areas, there was also
a subsidy ceiling based on the budget.
I could get about 12,000 RMB last year according to
the provision, but only 4,000 RMB was assigned to me.
I have asked for it many times, but no response.
(in Acheng district)
After the implementation of the NEMS in 2009, only
drugs on the NEML (307 species) were allowed to be used.
In the village clinics, only about 60–120 were used. The
full range of pharmaceuticals required by the NEML was
not available in many areas. Drug supply was also difficult
in many counties especially in mountain areas as a result
of lack of profits. The species and total amount of essential
medicines were not enough for daily treatment in village
clinics, resulting in a decrease in patients at village clinics.
We have no effective drugs, so a large proportion of
patients went to higher level hospitals. (in Xinjian
county)Not enough drugs, we couldn’t treat them, and after a
long time they won’t trust me anymore. (in Xinjian
county)There were no antifebrile/antipyretics, especially for
children, we cannot even cure a cold. No patients, how
can we make a living? (in Changshu county)
There are exceptions of course. In some areas (Xichuan
county and Pingchang county) where village doctors’
treatment was mainly based on the Traditional Chinese
Medicines (TCMs), the implementation of NEMS had lit-
tle impact on their revenues. Because TCMs were not lim-
ited by NEMS, village doctors could profits from drug
sales by selling TCMs as before.
The national essential drugs system has no influence
on my income, (because) I only use a few western
medicines. (in Pingchang county)Most village doctors, here, can treat diseases with
TCMs, so the effects of the national essential drugs
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about 30 patients every day, and my total annual
income was about 60,000 RMB. Of course, I was not
the highest-paid village doctor. (in Xichuan county)
National Basic Public Health Services
Promotion of the equalization of basic public health ser-
vices had been China’s focus in health-care reform since
2009. It aimed to ensure that urban and rural residents
had equal access to basic and the most effective public
health services, to narrow the gap between urban and
rural residents in basic public health services and further
to ensure that urban and rural residents get sick less
often. Meanwhile, The National Public Health Service
Standard was published, and it provided a framework to
assess the capacity and performance of public health
systems and public health governing bodies. Further-
more, the implementation of NBPHS was monitored
and managed as an obligation and mandatory task by
local governments.
I have to do these public health services, because
superiors will check on our working progress. If not
completed, we will lose part of bonus or even be
punished. (in Xinjian county)
The Chinese government had also committed to in-
creasing government funding for NBPHS, so the govern-
ment subsidy per person increased from 15 RMB in
2009 to 30 RMB in 2013 [37]. Village doctors could ob-
tain approximately 40% of the allowance for basic public
health services after completing the relevant work. The
subsidy was managed at the county level in accordance
with the principles of the local government. Primarily,
the subsidy was released to THCs, which were in charge
of the allocation of funds between themselves and the
village doctors.
In theory, we should get 12 RMB (40% of 30 RMB) per
capita, but in fact, we only got about 8 RMB on
average. (in Xinjian county)I did not know the standard for issue of allowance, I
got only 1300 RMB last year, but I was responsible for
at least 2,000 residents. (in Xichuan county)
Allowances for basic public health services were allo-
cated to village clinics by population health services. Be-
cause the number of village doctors in each village clinic
is different, the allowance for basic public health services
distributed to each village doctor also varies.
In our village, there is a total of 2,700 residents. If
there are two village doctors, the allowance for basicpublic health services is not too small, but there are 4
village doctors (in our village), thus each of us could
get only 800 RMB. …It is too little for us for living.
(in Pingchang county)
Village doctors had to perform basic public health ser-
vices divided into 11 categories that covered 43 items in
2013 as specified by the government. At this stage, NBPHS
mainly include the establishment of health records, health
education, immunization, prevention and treatment of in-
fectious diseases, chronic diseases (hypertension and dia-
betes) management, serious mental disease management,
child health care, maternal health-care services, elderly
health care, etc. A village doctor might provide basic public
health services for 2,000 rural peasants at most, although
there was often only one village doctor. There is no doubt
that NBPHS increased their workload and reduced the time
allowed to provide medical services.
It (public health service) takes a large part of my work
time, and less time is allocated to treatment. With less
out-patient services, my medical revenue decreased a
lot. (in Xinjian county)To get more time for out-patient services, I have to do
the public health services in the evening. Sometimes,
that makes me exhausted. (in Xinjian county)
New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme
The Chinese government launched NRCMS in 2003. Par-
ticipation in the NRCMS was voluntary, although farmers
were actively encouraged to join. At its inception, the
NRCMS aimed to provide health coverage for the nation’s
entire rural population by 2010 [41]. Population coverage
had extended rapidly; by the end of 2012, the NRCMS
had been introduced in 2,566 counties, covered 98.26%
of the rural population and has 805 million members
[42]. In addition, the NRCMS was operated at the
county level. The county health bureau or bureau of hu-
man resources and social security was responsible for
the design, implementation, management and adminis-
tration of the scheme. The origin of NRCMS revenues
is threefold: they come from central and local govern-
ments and households. NRCMS revenues were ear-
marked for paying for health services, including part of
the salaries and the operation costs of service providers.
Investment using NRCMS funds was not allowed. The
benefit package was determined by the funds available
from government subsidies and household contribu-
tions. NRCMS funds were raised to a new level (no less
than 290 RMB per capita in 2012), and part of NRCMS
funds could be used for remuneration for drug sales ac-
cording to the service provision. The total amount and
payment methods of NRCMS had major impacts on
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Xichuan county, the NRCMS funds were only 290 RMB
in 2013, while it was 650 RMB in Changshu county. In
Xichuan county, there was a reimbursement ceiling (50
RMB per capita) for outpatient service in village clinics,
but not at THCs. Therefore, patients would go to THCs
for a minor illness rather than to village clinics. For vil-
lage doctors, fewer patients resulted in lower medical
income.
Patients would rather to go to township health centers
for outpatient service, because they can get more
reimbursement. (in Xinjian county)In township health centers, at most 90 percent of the
cost of out-patient treatment (most of which is drug
expense) could be reimbursed, but only 50RMB at
most could be reimbursed in our clinics. Naturally
they choose township health centers, because their
reimbursement was over 50 percent. (in Xichuan
county)
According to the policy, village doctors could receive a
general fee for medical service from NRCMS funds for
outpatient service. The fee was a fixed proportion of total
NRCMS funds, and different counties developed specific
reimbursement standards and distribution modes. For ex-
ample, a village doctor could receive 5 RMB per visit or
per prescription in Xinjian and Xichuan county, respect-
ively, whereas village doctors could receive 10 RMB in
Changshu county. To avoid excessive costs, a reim-
bursement ceiling was established, and the village
clinics were monitored in areas such as outpatients,
pharmaceutical consumption and the intensity and ra-
tionality of prescriptions.
Excessive prescriptions were prohibited, and I could
only get the limited general fee. (in Changshu county)In the past, about 20 patients a day were treated in
our clinic, but now, less than 10 outpatients were
treated. …At the end of the month, we submit a list of
prescriptions. After the prescriptions are checked out,
we can get the general fees for medical service next
month. (in Xinjian county)
Discussion
A previous study indicated that motivation is influenced
not only by specific incentive schemes targeted at
workers but also by the whole range of health sector
reforms [43]. To better achieve the goals of health-care
reform and to strengthen the rural health-care system in
China, effects of policies on village doctors’ financial
incentives should be assessed [44-46]. How to useinnovative payment methods to serve the goals of health
sector reform was an important issue [47]. In this study,
we found that ongoing health system reforms had
impacted village doctors’ independence and gradually
transformed village doctors’ income structure. The in-
tegrated management of village doctors’ activities by
township-level staff has reduced their independence and
changed their roles. NEMS cancelled drug mark-ups, re-
moving their primary income source. The government
implemented a series of measures to compensate, in-
cluding paying them to implement public health ac-
tivities and provide services covered by social health
insurance.
Health-care reform policies were set at national levels in
a political process and were then communicated to subor-
dinate levels which were then charged with managerial
and administrative tasks of putting policy into practice.
County government was the main body to perform the
health-care reform policies; however, policy implementa-
tion was quite different among the six counties as a result
of different management styles and socioeconomic status.
Inconsistency of policy implementation had impacts on
the village doctor’s behaviours and motivation. Poor gov-
ernance and monitoring of village doctors’ behaviour and
differing behaviour of THCs was another factor influen-
cing the efficiency of policy implementation. As a synthe-
sized effect, the ongoing health-care reform policies had
gradually transformed village doctors’ income structure.
Accountability was a salient theme during the process of
health-care reform [48]. As a main mechanism of account-
ability, integrated management played an important role
in creating policy frameworks and was combined with
effective oversight and regulation. Historically, as a spe-
cial group, village doctors had always been self-
employed peasants who lacked supervision [9]. When
they lost institutional and financial support after the
economic reform in 1978, many coping strategies were
introduced such as over-prescribing drugs and injec-
tions, inflating drug mark-ups, informal user fees and
ability to leave the workplace and perform agriculture
work for income [5,49]. Under the integrated management
system, the various coping strategies used in response to
inadequate remuneration and poor supervision in the past
were limited or prohibited [5].
The workers in THCs received regular medical educa-
tion and were recruited by the government, they have
bianzhi and the certificates of permanent urban resi-
dence (Chengzhen Hukou) and enjoy urban welfare.
However, village doctors are farmers; they have the certifi-
cates of permanent rural residence (Nongcun Hukou) and
could not become a regular employee of THCs. In fact,
village doctors are temporary workers and are supervised
by THCs. Their incomes were partly restricted, and their
working time was also regulated. Thus, their income
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village doctors worked and were managed just similar to
an outreach worker of THCs in some areas, it was hard
for them to obtain the same benefits as a regular employee
in THCs. In China, the Household Registration System
(Hukou) prohibited the free migration of farmers to access
the urban welfare system [45]. Strictly speaking, village
doctor was not a formal professional title and could not be
considered as a real doctor. The lack of legitimacy granted
to village doctors by degreed health professionals was
another barrier to defining their work roles and wage rate
as workers in THCs [7,45]. The main objectives of the
NEMS, to improve access to essential medicines and re-
duce the out-of-pocket expenditures of patients, had been
achieved in some areas [31]. Village doctors’ prescribing
practices changed following the introduction of the NEMS
as a result of the short NEML [50]. All drugs on the
NEML were restricted by the zero-mark-up policy, so the
village doctor’s profits from drug sales were cancelled grad-
ually. Both the zero-mark-up policy and the low availability
of medicines could reduce the numbers of outpatients and
their medical income to a certain extent [7,31,51]. Although
there was an allowance for basic public health services,
remuneration for drug sales and general fee for medical
service, the extent to which these made up for the loss of
income was unclear because there was lack of transparency
and comparability of data on profits from drug sales. As
profits from drug sales were cancelled, village doctors
increasingly had to rely on salaries and subsidies from
the government [40]. However, the local governments
determined the companion policy and allocated budgets
based on actual medicine costs, and the subsidy repre-
sented only the lost profit mark-up (15%). Incentives for
over-prescription still exist [52] because a mark-up of at
least 15% and sometimes far above 15% had been
allowed previously.
As the superior authority, THCs also undertook part
of the responsibility for NBPHS, about 60%, and could
obtain the corresponding subsidy, so there is a conflict
of interest between THCs and village doctors. In
addition, the remuneration for drug sales and general fee
for medical service for each village doctor were also dis-
tributed by THCs based on their assessment of the vil-
lage doctor’s performance in providing public health
services and medical services. This situation might cause
misallocation and insufficient allocation to village doc-
tors because some THC directors believed that village
doctors have not performed their public responsibilities
[11]. Of course, inadequate supervision of village doc-
tors’ medical and public health services was also a rea-
son for insufficient allocation in some areas.
Public health services are freely provided to residents,
and all public health service items in rural areas were
provided mainly by village doctors and THCs accordingto the national guidelines and performance standard
for NBPHS. As more and more NBPHS items were im-
posed, although the government had increased financial
input year by year, no new health workers were intro-
duced to village clinics [50]. Village doctors therefore
had to take more and more responsibilities and work
under the NBPHS. Therefore, it decreased village doc-
tors’ enthusiasm and reduced their time for profitable
medical services. Village doctors noted that their work
was not equally valued by the government but also
showed their willingness to prioritize public health ser-
vices if they received a more substantial subsidy [11]. Al-
though the public health budget was tied to the annual
performance assessment to further encourage village
doctors to improve the quality of public health services,
whether it can compensate for their loss of profitable
activities and meet village doctors’ expectations remains
unclear.
The NRCMS achieved great success in reducing out-
of-pocket fee for medical services in the last few years
[53], but whether it increased the number of outpatients
in village clinics was difficult to determine [54]. Because
of varied compensation strategies between village clinics
and THCs, patients might be more inclined to go to
THCs for economic reasons. In all sampled counties, vil-
lage doctors could receive a general fee for medical
service, but there was no unified standard to allocate this
subsidy among the six counties.
It should be noted that compensation for NEMS and
NBPHS was not being assigned in a timely and complete
manner in some counties. The misappropriation and
interception of funds was still widespread, especially in
county- or city-level financial departments. A previous
study [55] showed that China’s social sectors are heavily
decentralized; the Ministry of Health has limited influ-
ence on the detailed design and implementation of
health system reform at the sub-national level. The
leaders of the local government in China were mostly
driven by economic progress and revenue generation.
However, health care was generally regarded as consum-
ing, not generating, revenue. We also found that, if the
head of the local government realized the importance of
health reform, health policies were better implemented.
Of course, in economically under-developed areas, it
was a great burden for local governments to ensure the
execution of these policies. Implementation of the pol-
icies had to be postponed because they were unable to
provide enough resources, although the central govern-
ment provided a great deal of resources. Therefore, the
economic condition of the county or district also influ-
enced the policy process.
To improve the provision of health-care services that the
government wants, a number of alternative methods (such
as a capitation payment, work-volume-based method and
Zhang et al. Human Resources for Health  (2015) 13:26 Page 10 of 11weight-based method) had been suggested for allocating
government subsidies [7,56]. We suggested that, based on
different contexts, reasonable compensation strategies
should be established and monitored, and sufficient
subsidies should be allocated in a timely manner [57].
The current study had a number of limitations. First, a
total of 49 village doctors participated in the in-depth
interview, and we were unable to represent the breadth
and depth of each of their views here. Second, the sam-
ple was not random and may in fact bias towards a bet-
ter situation than in poorer counties where the role
of the village doctors may be more important. Third,
although we aimed to presenting which and how health-
care reform policies influence village doctors’ income
structure, the extent of the effect of these policies on
their income and the interactions among policies was
not analysed because we believe that more quantitative
research might be better to clarify these points, but we
had not provided quantitative information—a major
missed opportunity. We hope to perform a more quan-
titative study to further research village doctors’ finan-
cial incentives and how health-care policies influence
them.Conclusions
The health-care reform policies have had lasting impacts
on village doctors’ income structure since the policies’
implementation in 2009. The village doctors have to rely
on the salaries and subsidies from the government after
the drug mark-up was cancelled. China’s national health
reforms are attempting to draw village doctors into the na-
tional health workforce, but the policies have impacted
their income and independence. Further research into
these concerns and monitoring of measures to adequately
compensate village doctors should be undertaken. Reason-
able compensation strategies should be established, and
appropriate subsidies should be allocated in a timely
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